What are we building?

We take a service that already runs behind Traefik and lock it down against anything that does not come from the WireGuard network. Afterwards the same name returns 403 Forbidden from outside and 200 over the VPN – with the same valid Let’s Encrypt certificate, no port numbers in the address bar and no certificate warning.

Three building blocks combine to do that, and it pays to keep their roles apart:

• Traefik’s IPAllowList – the actual protection. Anything not coming from 10.8.0.0/24 is rejected.
• Internal DNS via AdGuard Home – pure convenience. It makes the name resolve to the VPN address inside the tunnel instead of taking a detour via the public IP.
• Binding to the VPN interface – the strictest level, for services that should not see a reverse proxy at all.

Requirements

• A running WireGuard VPN on the 10.8.0.0/24 network, with the server holding 10.8.0.1
• AdGuard Home on the same server, bound to 10.8.0.1:53
• Traefik as a reverse proxy with a working Let’s Encrypt resolver
• A service you want to keep internal. For practice, traefik/whoami is enough – it echoes every header it receives

Step by step

Step 1: Put the service behind the allowlist

The core is two extra labels on the container you want to protect. To follow along we use whoami, because it prints every header it receives – that makes it immediately obvious later whether Traefik uses the right source IP:

# /opt/vpnonly/compose.yaml
services:
  whoami:
    image: traefik/whoami:v1.12.0
    container_name: whoami
    restart: unless-stopped
    networks: [proxy]
    labels:
      - traefik.enable=true
      - traefik.http.routers.whoami.rule=Host(`YOUR_DOMAIN`)
      - traefik.http.routers.whoami.entrypoints=websecure
      - traefik.http.routers.whoami.tls.certresolver=le
      - traefik.http.routers.whoami.middlewares=vpn-only@docker
      - traefik.http.middlewares.vpn-only.ipallowlist.sourcerange=10.8.0.0/24
      - traefik.http.services.whoami.loadbalancer.server.port=80

networks:
  proxy:
    external: true

The two decisive lines are the fifth and sixth. One defines a middleware called vpn-only, the other attaches it to the router. Both are required – more on that shortly.

cd /opt/vpnonly && docker compose up -d

Step 2: The counter-test – the same name twice

Without VPN, from any machine on the internet:

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" https://YOUR_DOMAIN/

403

And with the WireGuard tunnel up. Here it matters which tunnel you use: in the split tunnel from the WireGuard tutorial (AllowedIPs = 10.8.0.0/24) the name still points to the public IP. The request then runs past the tunnel and also gets 403 – the internal DNS in step 3 fixes that. Until then, tell curl by hand that the name should point to the server’s VPN address:

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --resolve YOUR_DOMAIN:443:10.8.0.1 https://YOUR_DOMAIN/

200

With a full tunnel (AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0) it works without --resolve too, because then the path to the public IP also runs through the tunnel.

That is the whole trick. Both requests go to the same name, both get the same certificate – only the source IP decides. As a cross-check, look at what whoami reports from inside the VPN:

curl -s --resolve YOUR_DOMAIN:443:10.8.0.1 https://YOUR_DOMAIN/ | grep -E "X-Real-Ip|X-Forwarded-For"

X-Forwarded-For: 10.8.0.2
X-Real-Ip: 10.8.0.2

Traefik sees the client’s VPN address, not the Docker network’s. That is no accident: when publishing a port, Docker performs a pure destination translation (DNAT) and leaves the source address untouched. This is why the allowlist works even though Traefik itself runs in a container.

Step 3: Internal DNS – so the name points the right way inside the VPN

With --resolve it works, but you can’t teach that to a browser. Without internal DNS the client resolves the name to the public IP: in a split tunnel the request then ends up outside the VPN at the 403, in a full tunnel it takes a detour via the public address that breaks the moment you tighten the public ports on the server.

A DNS rewrite in AdGuard Home takes care of it. Open the web interface, go to Filters → DNS rewrites and click “Add DNS rewrite”:

The upper field holds the service’s name, the lower one the server’s VPN address, that is 10.8.0.1. A leading *. works too if you want to redirect a whole subdomain at once. After saving, the entry appears in the list:

Check the result against the resolver directly. Before the entry it returns the public address:

dig +short @10.8.0.1 YOUR_DOMAIN

203.0.113.10

And after it:

dig +short @10.8.0.1 YOUR_DOMAIN

10.8.0.1

Conveniently, AdGuard also suppresses the AAAA answer: as long as you only create an IPv4 rewrite, the client gets no IPv6 address for that name at all and therefore cannot accidentally bypass the tunnel over IPv6. The IPv6 counter-check has to come back empty:

dig +short AAAA @10.8.0.1 YOUR_DOMAIN

Step 4: Hand the resolver to the clients

For the rewrite to take effect, the VPN clients have to actually use AdGuard. There is exactly one line for that in the WireGuard client configuration:

[Interface]
Address = 10.8.0.2/24
DNS = 10.8.0.1
PrivateKey = YOUR_PRIVATE_CLIENT_KEY

When the connection comes up, wg-quick registers the server as the resolver and removes it again on disconnect:

wg-quick up wg0

[#] wg setconf wg0 /dev/fd/63
[#] ip -4 address add 10.8.0.2/24 dev wg0
[#] ip link set mtu 1420 up dev wg0
[#] resolvconf -a wg0 -m 0 -x

cat /etc/resolv.conf

# Generated by resolvconf
nameserver 10.8.0.1

The resolvconf -a wg0 line is the important part. If it is missing, wg-quick found no tool to change the resolver configuration. A minimal Debian 13 has neither openresolv nor systemd-resolved installed – without one of them DNS = has no effect and the rewrite never applies.

Step 5: Why the public DNS record has to stay

It is tempting to delete the public A record as well. Do not, as long as Traefik obtains its certificates via HTTP-01: Let’s Encrypt fetches http://YOUR_DOMAIN/.well-known/acme-challenge/… from the outside for that. Without a public DNS record and a reachable port 80, the next renewal attempt after 60 days fails – and you notice only once the certificate has expired.

What matters is that the allowlist only hangs on the application router and not on ACME handling: Traefik answers the challenge itself before any middleware applies. Requests from outside still get 403 for everything else.

Be clear about one thing though: the name of your internal service is public knowledge regardless. It is in DNS and additionally in the Certificate Transparency logs, which anyone can search. You cannot hide the name – only the access. If that bothers you, you need wildcard certificates via the DNS-01 challenge; then a single *.YOUR_DOMAIN entry ends up in the log and the individual hostnames stay private.

Step 6: The stricter level – bind to the VPN interface

For services that do not need HTTPS from outside anyway, there is a stricter route: do not publish the port publicly in the first place. Docker can bind any port to a specific address – and 10.8.0.1 is only reachable through the tunnel:

    ports:
      - "10.8.0.1:53:53/tcp"
      - "10.8.0.1:53:53/udp"
      - "10.8.0.1:8080:80/tcp"

Check what is actually being listened on:

ss -tlnp | grep -E ":8080|:53 "

LISTEN 0  4096  10.8.0.1:53    0.0.0.0:*  users:(("docker-proxy",pid=852377,fd=8))
LISTEN 0  4096  10.8.0.1:8080  0.0.0.0:*  users:(("docker-proxy",pid=852401,fd=8))

On the left is the concrete VPN address and not 0.0.0.0 – that is exactly the difference. Run the counter-test on the server itself against its public IP. From another machine the netcup firewall would reject port 8080 anyway, and the test would prove nothing:

curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 5 http://YOUR_SERVER_IP:8080/

000

Not a 403 but no answer at all: there is nothing there to talk to. With "8080:80" instead of "10.8.0.1:8080:80" the same request answers 200 – that’s how you see the binding makes the difference. From the VPN, curl http://10.8.0.1:8080/ still returns 200.

When do you use which? Anything with a web interface that benefits from a reverse proxy (a nice name, a valid certificate, central middlewares) gets the allowlist. Anything only you operate and where raw protocols are involved – DNS, databases, admin ports, metrics endpoints – gets bound to the VPN interface directly. The two are not in conflict; they are two layers.

When it doesn’t work

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Maintenance & backups

The setup is pleasantly low-maintenance: the allowlist is two lines in a Compose file, and the DNS rewrite is one entry in AdGuard. There is nothing here that breaks on its own.

What you do have to keep an eye on:

• New services inherit nothing. Every additional container needs the middleware line on its own router. Put the two labels into your template, otherwise the next service sits open on the internet – and you will not notice, because everything works fine inside the VPN.
• The VPN subnet is now security-relevant. Whoever gets a WireGuard peer gets access to every internal service. Remove retired devices from wg0.conf consistently and check once a quarter with wg show wg0 which peers actually had a recent handshake.
• Certificates still travel the public path. After every change to the firewall, DNS or entrypoints it is worth verifying that Traefik can still renew – easiest with a test request to http://YOUR_DOMAIN/.well-known/acme-challenge/test, which has to return 404 and not 403.

There is little to back up here, but that little matters: the Compose files with the labels, /etc/wireguard/ including the keys, and the AdGuard directory with AdGuardHome.yaml, which holds the rewrites. All three belong in your Restic backup.

Realistic effort: set it up once, then just remember two lines for every new service. The quarterly ritual with the peer list takes five minutes.